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COMMONWEALTH V. STEPHENS: THE TAKING
DOCTRINE AT WORK IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAND USE PLANNING
INTRODUCTION
When the long hunters first ventured into "Kaintucke"
thousands of miles of unpolluted, untrammeled, free-flowing
streams served as avenues for their explorations. Today, only
a few remnants of that wilderness heritage remain relatively
unspoiled.
For those who would save these few pristine remnants for
the appreciation and enjoyment of all Kentuckians, espe-
cially those yet unborn, the time is very short.'
In 1972, the Kentucky General Assembly responded to this
warning from the Advisory Commission on Wild Rivers by en-
acting a series of statutes to protect and preserve the wilderness
rivers of Kentucky. The 1972 Wild Rivers Act with its 1976
amendments2 seeks to protect designated wilderness areas
through a system of limited land acquisition and land use regu-
lations. The land use regulations operate to preserve the wil-
derness character of certain Kentucky rivers and their shore-
lines through prohibition of residential and commercial devel-
opment. At the same time, the regulations allow the continua-
tion of existing land uses, primarily agriculture and forestry.
Regulation of land use is usually held to be a valid exercise
of police power and as such is not subject to the fifth amend-
ment, which prohibits the taking of property without just com-
pensation.3 Since 1922, however, the extent to which private
land use can be regulated has been limited by the United
States Supreme Court holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.' In Mahon, the Court held that regulation of land may
be so restrictive that it constitutes a taking of private property
I ADVISORY COMMISSION ON WILD RIVERS, NATURAL STREAMS IN KENTUCKY 1 (Janu-
ary 19, 1970) [hereinafter cited as NATURAL STREAMS IN KENTUCKY].
2 Kentucky Wild Rivers Act, Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 146.410-.530 (Supp. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as KRS1.
See 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, §§ 2.01, 6.02, 7.01 (1975).
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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for public use requiring compensation for the private land-
owner under the fifth amendment.
The Mahon doctrine has had a significant effect on state
efforts to establish effective environmental land use regula-
tion.5 Land use regulations are drafted cautiously, tempered by
the knowledge that the courts may require compensation for
regulations deemed too restrictive. Despite such drafting,
courts frequently find regulation of land use for the protection
of fragile environmental areas to be a taking of property requir-
ing compensation.'
Commonwealth v. Stephens7 is a clear example. In
Stephens, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that application
of the land use regulations prescribed by the 1972 Kentucky
Wild Rivers Act would constitute a taking of property without
just compensation. Stephens illustrates the potential of judi-
cial application of the taking doctrine to impede effective envi-
ronmental land use regulation. The decision can be more
clearly understood after an examination of other river protec-
tion statutes, the judicial construction of these statutes, and
the evolution of the Kentucky Wild Rivers Act.
I. WILD RwERS PROTECTION IN OTHER STATES
A. The Statutes
Twenty-five states have "some form of river protection
legislation."8 In several states the regulations are directed spe-
cifically at the protection of wild and scenic rivers.' In addition,
F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE at iv. 2 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BOSSELMAN]; COUNCIL OF STATE GOvERNMENTS, THE STATES' ROLE
IN LAND USE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, at v (1972); Metzger, Private Property and Envi-
ronmental Sanity, 5 Eco. L.Q. 793 (1976); E. Haskell, LAND USE AND THE ENvIRoNMENT:
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES, ENVIR. REP. (BNA), Monograph 20 at 1 (1974).
See BOSSELMAN, supra note 5, at 1-50, 139-212.
539 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1976).
Priesnitz, Minnesota's River Program, 1976 ENVT'L COM. 5, 6.
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.50 (West Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. §
17-902 (1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.761 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
104.31 (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. ENVIRON. CONsEaV. LAW § 15-2701 (McKinney Supp.
1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-35.1 (Supp. 1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1501.16 (Page
Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 390.805 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-1401 (Supp.
1973).
The wild rivers acts of New York and Massachusetts are similar to that of
Kentucky. N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 15-2709 (McKinney Supp. 1976); MAss. ANN.
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several states have enacted legislation for the protection of
coastal and inland wetlands. ° The statutes implicitly recognize
that uncontrolled development can destroy fragile waterside
wilderness areas." Mechanisms for the protection of rivers in-
clude state land acquisition, state acquisition of scenic or other
easements, and land use controls. 2 The land use controls are
implemented through various methods: Some statutes provide
for direct state control on scenic areas;'" others require local
governments to enact zoning ordinances which comply with
state standards and provide for the direct application of stan-
dards by the state government only in the event of noncompli-
ance by the local government.'4
Wild rivers statutes often operate to prevent private land-
owners from using their lands in a manner which will damage
wilderness environments. As a result, these statutes generate
controversies involving the taking doctrine when landowners
assert in court that the land use regulations are too restrictive.
The prohibited land use is generally a future use. The legal
question is whether the prohibition of a future different use of
land is a taking of property requiring compensation or merely
LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (Michie Supp. 1975). Each provides for police power regulation of
private land use and for compensation of private landowners if the regulation becomes
so great as to constitute a taking. Both New York and Massachusetts designate admin-
istrative officials to promulgate regulations necessary for the protection of the shore-
lines. The New York Act provides for compensation "in the event any land use is so
directed to be discontinued . . . ." The Massachusetts law provides for the power of
eminent domain in situations where the courts declare that the regulations are so
stringent as to constitute a taking.
' Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without
Just Compensation, 58 VA. L. Rxv. 876, 879-80 (1972); see also 1 RATHKOPF, supra note
3, at § 7.02.
Wetlands legislation is distinguished from wild rivers legislation in that wetlands
refers to the shores of lakes, ocean marshes, and lowland swamps whereas wild rivers
legislation concerns land immediately adjacent to rivers. In this Comment, both will
be considered as one type of regulation because in the context of the taking issue, both
types of legislation involve the regulation of private land for the protection of environ-
mentally sensitive land areas adjacent to bodies of water.
" Note, supra note 10, at 878-79 (1972).
, Priesnitz, Minnesota's River Program, 1976 ENVT'L COM. 5, 6-7.
,3 See, e.g., N.Y. ENvut. CONSERV. LAw § 15-2701 (McKinney Supp. 1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 11-1401 (1973).
" See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.761 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
104.31 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.26 (1974), § 59.971 (Supp. 1976).
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a police power regulation of land use for which compensation
is not required. 5
B. Judicial Reaction to the Statutes
Land use controls are a valid exercise of the police power. 8
Generally, a reasonable exercise of police power is constitu-
tional even if it renders severe economic damage to private
citizens.1 7 Exercises of police power, which require no compen-
sation, are distinguished from exercises of eminent domain
which require compensation for the taking of private property
for public use. 8 Although separate concepts, these two ideas
were combined in Justice Holmes' famous opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,9 where the Court held that
police power regulation may become so excessive that it consti-
tutes a taking, and thus compensation is constitutionally re-
quired.
The Mahon doctrine is often referred to as the "diminution
of value" test.2" Under the diminution test, when the effect of
the regulation on the land in question is to deny the landowner
any reasonable or profitable use, the regulation is deemed a
taking." The diminution test is often combined with a balanc-
ing test in which the benefits to society are compared with the
detriments to the property holder.2 Sometimes a nuisance test
is coupled with the diminution of value test.2 The nuisance
test requires no compensation unless the private land regula-
tions go beyond eliminating a nuisance to confer an actual
benefit on the public. Conversely, compensation is not re-
quired for regulations which merely operate to prevent the
private landowner from harming the public .2 The diminution
" 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at § 7.03.
" Id. at § 2.01.
' Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Comment, Regulation of Land Use:
From Magna Charta to a Just Formulation, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 904, 913 n.53 (1976).
" Comment, supra note 17, at 904.
" 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See BOSSELMAN, supra note 5, at 124-38.
Comment, supra note 17, at 911.
22 Metzger, supra note 5, at 793.
Note, supra note 10, at 887.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416-22 (1922); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
24 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at § 6.12.
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of value test is applied on a case by case basis.25 While there
have been many attempts to analyze these principles,"5 the
only generally accepted conclusion is that it is difficult to find
principles that will predict the outcome of specific cases.27
In situations where a future land use is prohibited by envi-
ronmentally directed land use regulations, the courts are div-
ided in determining when a taking has occurred. The fact
situations generally involve prohibitions against dredging and
filling of wetland lots and prohibitions against flood plain de-
velopment. Several courts have held that such prohibitions
qualify as takings. For example, in State v. Johnson,2 a Maine
court upheld Maine's site location law which required permits
for certain developments which substantially affected a local
environment. Johnson was denied a permit to use fill to elevate
his lot above the high water. Although the court upheld the
law, they held that the denial constituted a taking requiring
compensation because the preservation of the wetlands created
a public benefit. In MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals,2 1 the
plaintiff was denied permission to fill his shorefront property
pursuant to a local zoning ordinance which had as its objective
the preservation of wetlands in their natural state. The court
found that such a preservation would constitute a taking. In
Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of
Parsippany-Troy Hills,30 a New Jersey environmental preserva-
tion ordinance that prohibited dredging and filling was held to
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
2 See generally, 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at § § 6.01-.12; Binder, Taking Versus
Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands,
25 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1972); Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 1098, 1123-28 (1959); Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning,
58 COLuM. L. Rxv. 650 (1958); Kulser, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid
Taking, 57 MisN. L. REv. 1 (1972); Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Con-
cepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wisc. L. Rav. 1039; Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for
Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S.CAL. L. REv. 1 (1970-71); Comment, supra note
17.
BossEsAsN, supra note 5, at 322; Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36, 37 (1964).
n 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
" 255 N.E.2d 347 (Mass. 1970).
193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963).
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be an unconstitutional taking without compensation.
Yet there appears to be a trend developing in later deci-
sions to uphold similar land use regulations as constitutional
without compensation.3' In Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of
Dedham,32 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court distin-
guished Morris County and upheld a zoning ordinance which
restricted flood plain use to agricultural, silvicultural and rec-
reational uses.3 3 In Scott v. State,34 one of the few reported
decisions dealing directly with wild rivers legislation, the peti-
tioner argued that a taking without compensation resulted
from a temporary freeze on the use of her land. The Oregon
statute provides for a one-year waiting period during which the
property owner and the state attempt to reconcile their differ-
ences as to reasonable land use. If there is no agreement at the
end of one year, the landowner may proceed with the desired
use unless the statute provides compensation. The Oregon
court found the one-year freeze Without compensation to be a
reasonable exercise of the police power. Finally, in Just v. Mar-
inette County35 petitioner made the now familiar claim that the
denial of a permit to dredge and fill his wetlands property was
a taking without compensation. However, the Wisconsin court
upheld the permit denial, describing it as "a restriction on the
use of a citizen's property, not to secure a benefit for the public,
but to prevent a harm from the change in the natural character
of the citizen's property."3
C. Analysis of the Judicial Response
The issue in each of these cases is not whether the property
owner can continue his present use; instead, the issue is
whether the property owner may use the land in a new and
different way. Thus the precise loss to the landowner is the
difference between the commercial value of the present use and
11 Comment, supra note 17, at 918; cf. BOSSELMAN, supra note 5, at 322, 323.
32 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
- The court emphasized economic as opposed to environmental considerations;
further, the owner was allowed to continue reasonable uses, and the evidence conflicted
on the extent of diminution.
31 541 P.2d 516 (Ore. App. 1975).
201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
36 Id. at 767-68.
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the commercial value of future uses of the property.
In situations where the taking is a prohibition against a
future land use, conflicting values underlie the determination
of whether compensation is required. One view emphasizes the
right of property owners to make free and unfettered use of the
land which they possess .3 The other emphasizes the idea that
a property holder's use of land is limited by considerations of
the public interest.3 1
One indicator of a court's willingness to allow regulation
without compensation is the court's characterization of the
impact of a regulation as either conferring a new benefit on the
public or preventing a harm to a present public interest.
The difference in the outcome of the litigation in these cases
depends mostly upon whether the court views the potential
harm to the community as damage to an existing right or
interest of the community resulting from the activities of the
landowner . . . or whether it considers that there is a basic
freedom [for the landowner] to put land. . . to some benefi-
cial use and [that] to forego that right. . . is to confer upon
the public a benefit. .... 3.
This point is illustrated by the Johnson and Just decisions
in which different courts reached opposite conclusions in simi-
lar fact situations. In Johnson, the court stated that preserva-
tion of marshland, a public benefit, could not be accomplished
by rendering the private land "commercially valueless."40 This
approach casts the state in an affirmative role as it attempts
to secure a public benefit at the price of depriving the land-
owner of his present right to use the land in a commercially
valuable manner. In contrast, the court in Just held that the
private landowner was trying to increase the value of his land
to the damage of "the general public by upsetting the natural
environment . "... 1 With this approach, the private land-
owner is cast in the affirmative role as he attempts to acquire
a new benefit to the detriment of a present public right.
31 Commonwealth v. Stephens, 539 S.W.2d 303, 305-06 (Ky. 1976).
38 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
3 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at § 7.03.
,0 State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
4 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
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This analysis suggests that one rationale used by the
courts to allow increased land use regulation is an expansion
in the concept of what constitutes present public rights.4 2 Cor-
respondingly, private actions that were once considered inno-
cent may now be viewed as harmful to the public. For example,
in earlier decisions, the preservation of a marsh through regula-
tion was considered to constitute acquisition by the public of
a benefit which it did not previously possess. Some later court
decisions, however, indicate that the marsh is already a natural
resource of the public. Thus when the state prohibits dredging
of the marsh, it is merely preventing a private property owner
from destroying a public resource. This rationale permits the
expansion of allowable police powers without necessitating
rejection of the Mahon doctrine.43
Increased awareness of the impact that private land use
decisions have upon the welfare of society will likely result in
continued expansion of the concept of present public rights.44
Furthermore, as the societal costs of certain types of private
land uses become known, "landowners may validly be required
to bear the external costs of their own actions."45 The dredging
and filling of wetlands provides an example of how unregulated
private land use generates external costs:
A great part of the cost of wetlands development is therefore
borne not by the private developer, but by other segments of
society. Fishermen pay for wetlands development in reduced
catches; consumers in higher prices for fish and oysters;
sportsmen and nature enthusiasts in lost recreational oppor-
tunities; and neighboring landowners in increased flood dam-
age. Society as a whole must bear the cost of an artificial
increase in the rate of estuarine "decay."4
Coupled with this growing awareness of the cost to society of
private land use decisions is an increased allegiance to the
,2 Comment, supra note 17, 919-35 (1976).
" See, Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. 1972).
"TASK FORCE ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND LAND USE INFORMATION AND TECHNOL-
OGY, LAND: STATE ALTERNATIVES FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, 4-8 (Council of State
Governments 1975).
11 Dunham, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650, supra note 26 at 664, noted in 1 RATHKOPF,
supra note 3, at § 7.02.
,S Note, supra note 10, at 879 (1972).
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concept that our natural resources do not belong to this genera-
tion alone but are held in trust for future generations. 7 The
logical response by the courts is an increasing tendency to sus-
tain land use regulations which are designed to protect our
environment."
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE KENTUCKY WILD RIVERS ACT
The Kentucky Wild Rivers Act, originally enacted in 1972,
has been shaped by an interplay of legislative and judicial
forces. In 1972, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the
original wild rivers legislation "to preserve the unique primi-
tive character of those streams in Kentucky which still retain
a large portion of their natural and scenic beauty, and to pre-
vent future infringement on that beauty by impoundments or
other manmade works." 9 The Act designates wild rivers by
name, and provides for the addition to the system of "streams
• . .that are essentially free-flowing, with shorelines and sce-
nic vistas essentially primitive and unchanged, free from the
works of man and pleasing to the eye." 50
The Secretary of the Department for Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection is required to: (1) Establish the
boundaries of the system; 51 (2) promulgate "regulations neces-
sary for the preservation and enhancement of the stream areas
; .,52 and (3) exercise the power of eminent domain to pur-
chase a fee simple or lesser interest in land as necessary.-3 The
1972 Act mandated various land use regulations, including: (1)
Prohibiting new roads and buildings; (2) prohibiting all min-
ing; (3) prohibiting mechanical modes of transportation; (4)
allowing select cutting of timber with the approval of the secre-
tary; (5) allowing construction of utility and pipe lines with the
approval of the secretary; and (6) allowing continuation of ex-
isting agricultural land use.54
'1 1 B.CoHEN & V. YANNACONE, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES at § 2.1
(1972).
" 2 id. at § 13.1 (Supp. 1975).
, KRS § 146.220 (Supp. 1976).
" KRS § 146.230 (Supp. 1976).
" KRS § 146.250 (Supp. 1976).
52 KRS § 146.270 (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 146.280 (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 146.290 (1972) (amended 1976).
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While the prohibitions seem strict, they are reasonable in
light of the type of land they are designed to protect. By statute
the affected land areas must be "essentially primitive. . . and
free from the works of man."5 One example of the land type
being regulated is the Rockcastle River, which the Advisory
Commission on Wild Rivers describes as "rugged, wilderness in
character with limited access." 6 Although these regulations
might qualify as burdensome if applied to heavily developed
areas, the Act does not apply to any developed area. It is not
unduly burdensome to prohibit the construction of new build-
ings on land which is remote and currently used only for the
production of timber or for agricultural purposes.
Commentators disagreed on the extent of compensation
required under the 1972 Act. The express language of the Act
clearly rules out the purchase of all lands within the system.57
Obviously, if some land within the system is privately owned,
the regulation of private use would be essential to protection
of these wilderness areas. The Act also states that nothing in
the law should be construed to "deprive any landowner of his
property or any interest or right therein without just compensa-
tion." One commentator interpreted this "just compensa-
tion" clause as merely a superfluous restatement of constitu-
tional principles added to allay the objections of opposing legis-
lators." A Kentucky circuit court disagreed with this interpre-
tation. Focusing on the just compensation language, the court
held that "to the extent that the land may not be used, the
owner is, by express provision of the Act, entitled to compensa-
tion." 0
The state appealed the circuit court decision to the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court while the 1976 General Assembly was in
session. The constitutional attack on the statute was well pub-
51 KRS § 146.250 (Supp. 1976).
11 NATURAL STREAMS in KENTUCKY, supra note 1, at 16.
51 KRS § 146.220 provides, "It is not [intended] . . . to require or to authorize
acquisition of all lands or interests in lands within the exterior boundaries or the
stream areas but to assure preservation of the scenic, ecological and other values and
to provide proper management of the recreational wildlife, water and other resources."
" KRS § 146.289 (1972) (amended 1976).
" Brief for Citizens' League to Protect the Surface Rights, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
at 6-13, Commonwealth v. Stephens, 539 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1976).
11 Commonwealth v. Stephens, No. 85519, at 2 (Franklin Circuit Court, June 23,
1975) (construing KRS § 146.280).
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licized and it is safe to assume that the members of the legisla-
ture were well aware of the adverse circuit court ruling." The
response by the legislature was to enact Senate Bill 309, a
major revision of the Act which focused on private land use
regulation."
Senate Bill 309 removed any doubts about legislative in-
tent to regulate private lands by adding the following sentence
to the introductory portions of the Wild Rivers statute: "It is
the intent of KRS 146.200 to 146.350 to impose reasonable regu-
lations as to the use of private and public land within the
authorized boundaries of wild rivers. . . and where necessary,
to enable the department to acquire. . . interests. . . to lands
within the authorized boundaries. . . ,,"1 The just compensa-
tion clause in the 1972 statute which was the basis for the
circuit court decision in Stephens was changed from requiring
compensation for any deprivation of "property or any interest
or right therein" to a requirement that compensation be pro-
vided for the taking of a "fee simple title to or lesser interest
in property." 4 These changes indicate that private land use
will be regulated and that compensation will be provided only
for the taking of a legally recognized property "interest" or
"estate."
The changes are significant because they remove the basis
for the circuit court decision. The circuit court had construed
the 1972 Act to require compensation to the extent that land
use was prohibited. Presumably, under this interpretation a
landowner could collect compensation if regulations prevented
the use of land for a more "valuable" purpose, for example,
where a landowner is prevented from subdividing land cur-
rently devoted to agricultural purposes. Under the 1976 revi-
sions, compensation will be given only for the taking of an
interest in land, not for prevention of a more valuable use of
land.
" Wild Rivers Job is Only Partly Done, Courier Journal, Dec. 25, 1975, § A, at
22, col. 1; id.Jan. 22, 1976, § C, at 3, col. 1.
,2 1976 Ky. Acrs ch. 197 (amending KRS §§ 146.210-.990 (1972)) (codified at KRS
§§ 146.210-.990 (Supp. 1976)).
,3 1976 Ky. AcTS, ch. 197, § 2 (amending KRS § 146.220 (1972)) (codified at KRS
§ 146.220 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
" 1976 Ky. AcTs, ch. 197, § 8 (amending KRS § 146.280 (1972)) (codified at KRS
§ 146.280 (Supp. 1976)).
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In addition, the 1976 revisions greatly liberalize the land
use regulations. All existing uses are exempted from the regula-
tions. Construction of new roads and buildings, which was pro-
hibited before, is now permitted if it is necessary to achieve a
permitted use. The earlier prohibition on all mining was
changed so that only strip mining is prohibited. Mechanical
transportation is now allowed in connection with existing uses.
Finally, the revised regulations permit a landowner to apply for
a change of use in cases where he wishes to engage in select
cutting of timber, resource removal, or agricultural use. The
revisions establish a procedure that guarantees the landowner
a timely answer to his application for a permit, judicial review,
and compensation for lost profits due to wrongful restraint of
land use. 5
In sum, the amended Act provides reasonable land use
regulations well suited for the designated wilderness areas. In
addition, provisions are made for the public purchase of private
lands where necessary. The Act protects the right of private
landowners to use their land in a reasonable manner and at the
same time provides necessary protection for a natural resource
which belongs to each of us.
III. STEPHENS V. COMMONWEALTH
Stephens v. Commonwealth66 provides an opportunity to
examine the relationship of the taking doctrine to
environmental policy. Stephens is the first decision of the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court which addresses the validity of regulat-
ing private land use for the purpose of preserving scenic and
wilderness areas. In holding that imposition of the 1972 land
use regulations would be a taking without compensation, the
Court indicates a preference for a limited conception of what
constitutes present public rights in environmental conflicts.
The case is unique among previously cited cases in that it deals
directly with a wild rivers statute in which land use regulations
are prescribed by the statute.
e 1976 Ky. AcTs, ch. 197, § 9 (amending KRS § 146.290 (1972)) (codified at
KRS § 146.290 (Supp. 1976)).
16 539 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1976).
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A. Background
Stephens was the manager and principal owner of
"Tombstone Junction," a commercial "wild west town" which
is located on a major highway. The large land holding on which
the amusement town is located includes land bordering the
Cumberland River just upstream from scenic Cumberland
Falls. This stretch of river is included in the designated rivers
protected by the Kentucky Wild Rivers Act. Stephens had
plans to provide transportation from Tombstone Junction to a
spot where tourists could view the falls, either by chairlift or
by train. When Stephens began bulldozing and cutting timber,
Kentucky's Secretary of Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection filed suit in Franklin Circuit Court seeking an in-
junction against further operations.
The circuit court issued the injunction but held that the
Commonwealth would have to pay for what it took, declaring
that the Kentucky Wild Rivers Act required compensation to
the extent that any landowner is deprived of any land use.6 7
While the case was on appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court,
the 1976 Kentucky General Assembly amended the law, loosen-
ing the land use restrictions. The amendments were enacted on
March 29, 1976,8 and became effective on June 19, 1976.9 The
Stephens decision, based on the 1972 Act without the
amendments, was handed down on July 2, 1976 after the
amendments had become effective.
B. The Opinion
In Stephens the Court held that where the official bounda-
ries of the Wild Rivers System are not yet established, applica-
tion of the 1972 regulations would constitute a taking of prop-
erty without compensation."0 The opinion included three major
arguments in support of the decision. First, the Court held that
there can be no violation of the Act until the boundaries of the
Wild Rivers System are established. The Court noted that
these boundaries were not delineated at the time the original
' Commonwealth v. Stephens, No. 85519 (Franklin Circuit Court, June 23, 1975).
Legislative Record, April 5, 1976 at 34-35 (Legislative Research Commission).
" KRS § 146.290 (1976).
7, 539 S.W.2d at 303.
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action was filed, and they had not yet been delineated. The
Court reasoned that since the boundaries were unknown, it was
impossible to determine whether the landowner's property fell
within the regulated area. The Court concluded that the
boundaries must be established before a landowner can be held
in violation of the Act.71 As the concurring opinion notes, the
Court could have dismissed the request for an injunction on
this ground alone.72 Instead, the Court chose to examine the
constitutional issues raised by the Act.
Second, the Court held that if the Act were currently in
force, it would violate the Kentucky Constitution as a taking
without just compensation. 73  The Court first cites
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: "If a regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."" The Court does not
attempt to evaluate the 1972 land use regulations in terms of
the particular property involved, nor does it attempt to limit
its constitutional analysis to the facts of the case. The Court
simply concludes that if these regulations were applied, they
would qualify as a taking.75
Third, the Court held that the statute is enabling rather
than self-executing legislation,7 on the theory that if the regu-
lations were construed as self-executing and thus currently in
force, they would constitute a taking. 77 The Court states that
"[t]o hold that the Act is self-executing would be to violate
Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution.7
7, Id. at 307, 308.
Id. at 309 (concurring opinion).
73 Id. at 306, 307. Ky. CONST. § 13 provides "... nor shall any man's property be
taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and without
just compensation being previously made to him."
7 539 S.W.2d at 307.
15 Id. at 306, 307.
11 The Court states:
If [the Act] is self-executing, then the legislature itself has made a
taking, has designated the land use, and has attempted to provide for de-
ferred payment. On the other hand, if the Act is enabling legislation only,
we must examine the Act itself to ascertain the methods or programs by
which the goal the legislature sought to accomplish may be accomplished.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 306, 307.
" Id. at 307.
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C. Weaknesses of the Opinion
There are several problems with the Court's analysis. First
the Court did not need to raise a constitutional issue, since the
case could have been dismissed and the injunction denied until
the boundaries were established. As Justice Palmore notes in
his concurring opinion:
The "wildest" aspect of this controversy involving the "Wild
Rivers Act" is that a suit was brought to enjoin a violation of
the act within a geographic area that has never been defined
... . Technically that should end the matter and obviate
the rest of the discussion. What the majority opinion does,
however, is to provide some further guidance. .... 1
Even if traditional objections to the unnecessary raising of
constitutional questions are overlooked, the value of the
"guidance" offered by the Court is significantly reduced be-
cause the statute on which the analysis is based was thoroughly
revised before the opinion was handed down. The 1976 General
Assembly made many changes in the land use regulations, °
and although the Court takes notice of the 1976 amendments,
it does not refer specifically to the language of the new law."
Because of the significant changes in the 1976 amendments,
the Court's analysis of the 1972 regulations is not necessarily
applicable to the current law.
Application of the taking doctrine is usually on a case by
case basis, requiring an examination of all the relevant facts
before a decision is rendered. 2 However in determining that
application of the 1972 regulations would be a taking, the Court
does not evaluate the impact of the regulations on the specific
property in this case. In Stephens the regulated land was a
forested hillside, linked with commercial property in a scenic
area. Upon close examination of the facts, the Court might
have found that the statute, which allowed selective cutting of
timber, was not an unreasonable burden on the private land-
owner.
1, Id. at 309.
KRS § 146.290 (Supp. 1976). For an explanation of these changes, see text
accompanying note 65, supra.
11 539 S.W.2d at 305.
s2 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 3 at § 6.03.
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Another problem created by the Court's failure to analyze
the impact of the regulations in light of the particular facts of
this case is that the holding of the decision is broader than
necessary. Since the land in Stephens adjoins commercial
property, the impact of the regulations might be more severe
than in cases where the same regulations were applied to forest
land in a remote and relatively inaccesible area. The Court
does not consider such distinctions because it makes no at-
tempt to limit its holding to the facts of the case.
The Stephens opinion interprets portions of the Wild Riv-
ers Act as enabling legislation in an apparent effort to uphold
the constitutionality of the Act. However, the mandatory lan-
guage of the Act seems clear: "[The secretary] shall, by June
16, 1974 determine generally the boundaries. . . .The secre-
tary shall adopt such rules . . . .Land uses to be allowed as
follows ... "3 In the absence of specific analysis of statutory
language to justify its interpretation, the Court's determina-
tion that the Act is enabling seems questionable.
The most critical objection to the Court's reasoning in
Stephens is the Court's refusal to consider an expanded con-
cept of present public resources. The Court declares that
"[tlhe beauty of the Cumberland River is something wonder-
ful to behold."84 In an early opinion dealing with the ownership
of wild animals, the United States Supreme Court stated,
"[tihere are some things which belong to no one, and the use
of which is common to all."8" Arguably, the pristine character
of these wilderness areas is a present natural resource belonging
to all, which no private landowner has the right to destroy. As
the public becomes aware of the damage that a private land-
owner's unrestricted use of land can inflict upon society,88 the
courts must be ready to sustain the reasonable exercise of the
police power necessary to prevent such harms. 87
D. Impact of the Decision
If Stephens is interpreted as requiring the Commonwealth
KRS § § 146.250, .270, .290 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
539 S.W.2d at 306.
Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526 (1896).
See text accompanying note 48, supra.
See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 765-69 (Wis. 1972).
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to purchase all lands located within the Wild Rivers System,
the System has been dealt a crippling blow.88 Such purchases,
requiring an estimated public expenditure of seventy-four mil-
lion dollars, would result in an unnecessary shifting of land
ownership from the private to the public sector.89
Two arguments weigh heavily against such a construction.
First, the two factors underlying the decision, the strict land
use regulations of the 1972 Act and the lack of delineated
boundaries, are no longer present. The 1972 regulations have
been amended, and the official boundaries have been estab-
lished.10 The doctrine of precedent requires that the holding
not include the Court's opinions but instead be limited to the
Court's decision on the material facts.9' Recognizing this prin-
ciple, the official position of the Office of General Counsel of
Kentucky's Department for Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Protection is that the holding in Stephens is limited to
situations where the boundaries of the system are not estab-
lished. 2
The second argument against a construction of Stephens
as requiring purchase of all regulated land areas is the growing
documentation of the detrimental impact of private land use
decisions on society as discussed earlier. 3 The lack of effective
land use planning has been accompanied by conversion of pro-
ductive agricultural and forest land to urban sprawl; loss of
historic landmarks; difficulty and unnecessary expense in
finding locations for environmentally sensitive facilities; con-
struction in hazardous locations; construction requiring unnec-
essary expense in meeting energy, water, and waste disposal
needs; loss of open space; and damage to fragile wilderness
u Even if the decision is limited to its facts, Stephens will still influence the
decisions of state administrators. See Courier Journal, Jan. 22, 1976, § C. at 3, Col. 1.
A leading authority has concluded that a significant aspect of the taking issue is its
influence on the decisions of administrators who attempt to anticipate court decisions.
BossELMAN, supra note 5 at iv, 323, 324.
u Courier Journal, Jan. 22, 1976, § C, at 3, col. 1.
"Telephone interview with Alan Harrington, Office of General Counsel, Ky.
Dept. for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, October 29, 1976.
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALU L.J. 161 (1930).
,2 Telephone interview with Alan Harrington, Office of General Counsel, Ky. Dept
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, October 29, 1976.
" See text accompanying notes 8-48, supra.
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areas. 4 The Kentucky Supreme Court recognizes the power of
the state to impose police power regulation without compensa-
tion,95 even in situations where the landowner is denied the
most profitable use,9" or where the private loss is for the public
benefit. 7 A recognition of the public harm permitted by unre-
gulated private land use coupled with application of these tra-
ditional police power concepts should logically result in an in-
creased acceptance of land use regulation for environmental
purposes."
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Supreme Court will soon have to deal with
these problems because two new suits have been filed in lower
Kentucky courts challenging the Wild Rivers Act.9 In addition,
the Court will increasingly be called upon to sustain land use
regulation statutes. For example, statewide comprehensive
land use planning is supported by federal and state officials
and has been adopted by twenty-one states."9 Furthermore,
11 TASK FORCE ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND LAND USE INFORMATION AND TECHNOL-
OGY, LAND: STATE ALTERNATIVES FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, 5, 51 (Council of State
Governments 1975).
City of Shively v. Illinois Central R.R., 349 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1961).
Scholemer v. City of Louisville, 182 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1944).
' Clark v. City of Paducah, 439 S.W,2d 84 (Ky. 1969).
" In situations where the courts uphold the constitutionality of environmental
land use regulations, the question of whether the private landowner will receive com-
pensation remains. The fact that the power exists to impose burdensome regulations
on landowners without compensation does not mean that it is wise to do so. Legisla-
tures should consider the merits of providing compensation for landowners where al-
though not technically an unconstitutional taking, the regulation would cause signifi-
cant loss to the private landowner.
" Telephone interviews with Alan Harrington, Office of General Counsel, Ky.
Dept. for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, October 29, 1976 and
February 28, 1977. Stephens v. Commonwealth, Civil Action Nurfiber 2948, McCreary
Circuit Court, is described by Harrington as a reverse condemiiation action brought
by the executor of Stephens' estate. During the action discussed in this Comment,
Stephens was prohibited from certain land uses by court order; Civil Action 2948 seeks
compensation for losses due to these restrictions. The other action, Stearns Coal &
Lumber Co. v. Kentucky, Civil Action Number 2294, is also described as a reverse
condemnation action alleging the unconstitutionality of the Kentucky Wild Rivers
Act. As of February 28, a trial date had not been set for either case.
2o' COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES' ROLE IN LAND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, 6, 7, 16 (1972); id. 26 (Supp. 1972); TASK FORCE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
AND LAND USE INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY, LAND: STATE ALTERNATIVES FOR PLANNING
AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 94, at 10, 11.
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environmental problems will require solutions through land use
regulation. The Court must not allow its interest in preserving
freedom of land use for the landowner to protect private actions
which harm the public interest.
Howell Hopson
